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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
CALVIN GOULD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELE-
PHONE AND TELEGRAPH COM-
PANY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
8600 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's statement of facts although substantially 
correct is complicated by immaterial matter and erroneous 
conclusions of law. The material facts in the case are ex-
tremely simple and undisputed. 
It was the practice of respondent to list in the classi-
fied section, or yellow pages, of its directories the names 
and numbers of business and professional subscribers to 
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telephone service in portions of the Ogden territory (Tr. 
20). Appellant's name, business address, and telephone 
number were inadvertently omitted from the yellow pages 
of the 1956 directory, although correctly appearing in the 
alphabetical section (Ex. F). 
The yellow pages of the directory are an advertising 
medium (Tr. 18). Respondent sells space in this section to 
such advertisers and at such rates as may be agreed upon 
(Tr. 19). All directories do not have a classified section, 
and respondent does not hold itself out to the public as 
furnishing advertising space therein (Tr. 86-87). No such 
services or rates are contained in the tariffs filed with the 
Public Service Commission, and that body does not assert 
or exercise any jurisdiction over the yellow pages (Tr. 
86-87). 
Although the trial judge evidently considered that de-
fendant's motion for a directed verdict against it for nom-
inal damages should have been sustained, he nevertheless 
granted the plaintiff a judgment against the defendant for 
the sum of $75.00 and costs (Tr. 39). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF SUSTAINED NO DAMAGE BE-
CAUSE OF THE OMISSION OF HIS NAME, 
ADDRESS, AND NUMBER FROM THE YEL-
LOW PAGES OF THE DIRECTORY. 
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POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ASSESSING NOM-
INAL DAMAGES IN THE SUM OF SEVENTY 
FIVE DOLLARS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF SUSTAINED NO DAMAGE BE-
CAUSE OF THE OMISSION OF HIS NAME, 
ADDRESS, AND NUMBER FROM THE YEL-
LOvV PAGES OF THE DIRECTORY. 
We concede for the purpose of this action that defen-
dant was contractually obligated to list the plaintiff in the 
yellow pages of the directory. This concession makes it 
wholly unnecessary to determine whether there was a stat-
utory duty to list the plaintiff in that section of the direc-
tory. See McTighe v. New England Telephone & Telegraph 
Co., 216 F. 2d 26, Vial v. Donnelly, 10 N. E. 2d 239. 
With the mass of immaterial evidence and argument 
of appellant eliminated by this concession, we go directly 
to the above point which is all that is necessary to consider 
to dispose of the plaintiff's appeal. 
Plaintiff alleged that as a direct and proximate result 
of the omission of his name from the yellow pages, he has 
"been damaged in the amount of $1,000.00 for profits here-
tofore lost, and in the amount of $5,000.00 for prospective 
profits lost." The jury verdict which the trial court va-
cated awarded plaintiff $1,000.00 for past lost profits, and 
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$1,000.00 for future or prospective lost profits. Since the 
plaintiff in his complaint claimed only a loss of profits, 
and since there was no pretrial enlarging the claim, his 
appeal must fail unless there is proof of this special damage. 
The plaintiff is a lawyer, practicing in Ogden since 
1953, with intervals of employment as a claims investigator 
for an insurance company (Tr. 46). When the 1956 direc-
tory came off the press in December, 1955, his office was 
in the Kiesel Building. The following March, he moved to 
the Eccles Building, and was given a new telephone number. 
By this move the· plaintiff rendered any listing in the 1956 
directory deceptive and erroneous. 
Plaintiff testified with respect to his earnings before 
and after the 1956 directory was published. These earnings 
steadily increased after the publication of this directory 
(Tr. 76-77-78). At this point there occurred a most unique 
attempt by the plaintiff to lift himself by his own boot-
straps. He 'vas permitted to classify his earnings into two 
categories, that derived from what he called "new" business, 
and that derived from what he called "old" business (Tr. 
62-70). He was then permitted to testify that the falling 
off in earnings from "new" business was due to the omis-
sion of his name from the yellow pages of the directory. 
Finally, he was permitted to testify that according to his 
estimate, he suffered a loss of earnings of approximately 
$200.00 per month during the time the 1956 directory was 
in circulation (Tr. 71-72). All of the foregoing testimony 
was elicited over the objection that it called for conclusions 
of the witness and was self-serving and incompetent. 
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No evidence whatever was offered with respect to the 
cost or expense of maintaining plaintiff's office during the 
period of the earnings to which he testified. 
The testimony of Mr. Ira Huggins was to the effect 
that he had extracted from the 1956 telephone directory the 
yellow pages containing the names and numbers of Ogden 
lawyers, and that this section afforded a ready reference 
to those numbers. Since the plaintiff's name did not appear 
on the yellow pages, he went to considerable trouble to 
locate the plaintiff on an occasion when he desired to confer 
with him concerning some legal transactions. It apparently 
never occurred to Mr. Huggins to refer to the alphabetical 
section of the directory when he wished to contact the plain-
tiff by telephone. 
The testimony of Mr. Glenn Adams was of the same 
character as that of Mr. Huggins. He testified that on one 
or two occasions he wished to refer to the plaintiff some 
accounts which had been placed in his hands for collection, 
and since he did not find the plaintiff's name in the yellow 
pages, he concluded that plaintiff was no longer practicing 
law in Ogden. He referred these collection matters to an-
other young lawyer in Ogden. 
Mr. Adams was a busy lawyer. He was so busy in fact 
that he did not have time to consider the qualifications of 
lawyers to whom he referred his excess business. He went 
down the list of lawyers in the yellow pages of the directory 
and selected one at random. Unless, a lawyer's name was in 
the yellow pages of the current directory, he did not get 
any business from Mr. Adams. However, this excess busi-
ness which Mr. Adams referred to young lawyers were 
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cases where the fee "at most could be $25.00 or something" 
(R. 40-42). 
The foregoing is in substance all of the evidence which 
could fairly be said to refer to the question of damages. It 
falls far short of proof of any damage at all, much less 
damages legally attributable to the omission of the plain-
tiff's name and number from the yellow pages of the 1956 
directory. 
With respect to loss of profits, all that need be said 
is that there is no basis for computing profits, because 
there is no evidence of the expenses which plaintiff was 
required to bear in order to obtain any income by the prac-
tice of law. 
There is likewise no evidence of any loss of income 
or business. All that appears in the record with respect to 
plaintiff's earnings or income is to the effect that they 
increased during the period his name was omitted from the 
yellow pages of the 1956 directory as compared with his 
earnings prior to that time. 
It is possible that Mr. Adams would have referred 
some additional business to the plaintiff if his name had 
been in the yellow pages, but it is extremely doubtful if 
the plaintiff would have accepted the employment even if 
the client and he could have agreed upon the terms of em-
ployment. This was contingent fee business, and the fee 
involved was at most $25.00. Instead of complaining of 
any loss of business that might have been referred to him 
by Mr. Adams, plaintiff should consider himself fortunate 
that he escaped the employment. It is certain that the 
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plaintiff could not have handled such referred business at 
any profit. 
Apart from the foregoing considerations, a fatal defect 
in the plaintiff's case is the complete absence of any con-
nection between any possible loss of profits, earnings, or 
business and the omission of his name from the yellow pages 
of the directory. His classification of his earnings into that 
derived from "old" and "new" business is a mere manipu-
lation of words. It is self-serving, a mere conclusion, and 
amounts to nothing as evidence. In the same category is 
the plaintiff's testimony to the effect that he lost approxi-
mately $200.00 per month as a result of the omission of 
his name from the yellow pages. This has the additional 
vice of deciding the very issue being tried. It was pure 
speculation or guesswork without any fact to support it. 
It was exactly the same kind of evidence that this court 
held to be of no probative value whatever. 
In Bigler v. Fryer, 82 Utah 380, 25 P. 2d 598, the 
plaintiff had been deprived of the use of irrigating water 
to which he was entitled, and the court awarded him a 
judgment for the amount he testified his crop would have 
been worth if he had had the use of the water. We quote 
from that decision: 
"* * * The testimony on which damages 
were based are the answers to the following ques-
tions asked separate witnesses: 
" 'Q. Do you have an opinion as to how 
much less the crop was worth at the end of the 
season than it would have been, taking into 
consideration the entire season and the condi-
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tion of the crops in that neighborhood, if the full 
water had been used ?'' 
"Over objection the witness answered, $150. 
Another witness was asked : 
" 'Q. What, in your opinion, from your 
experience with raising other crops in that vi-
cinity, was the shortage in the market value of 
the crop after you sold it by reason of the ab-
sence of this 7 hours of water?' 
"Over objection this witness answered, $100. 
"These questions called for conclusions, the very 
issue the court should decide. A proper measure of 
damages would be the rental value of the 7 hours 
of water, or, if that be not obtainable, the loss to 
the growing crops as a result of the loss of water. 
The respond'ent adopted the latter test, but offered 
no competent evidence to support it. * * *" 
* * * * * 
"There being no adequate or competent evidence 
to support the judgment for damages, a judgment 
for no more than nominal damages can be sustained. 
The legal right of respondent having been infringed 
upon by appellant the law presumes damage, but 
since the amount of actual damages is not shown by 
competent evidence a judgment for $1 nominal dam-
ages is all that may be sustained. * * *" 
Again in Bingham, etc. v. Jordan School District, 61 
Utah 149, 211 Pac. 981, testimony such as that given by 
the plaintiff in the present case was held to be totally in-
sufficient to prove any loss or damage attributable to a 
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breach of contract. The questions and answers were as 
follows: 
"Q. Did you sustain any damages by reason of 
this delay in the furnishing of the brick? 
"A. In the neighborhood of about $4,000.00. 
"Q. State the items of your damages? 
"A. Well, the damage was to the amount of 
$2,000.00." 
Another interesting instance in which the plaintiff es-
timated that he had sustained loss of profits in a stated sum 
as a result of the conduct of the defendant is to be found 
in the case of U. S. v. Griffith-Gornall & Carman, Inc., 210 
F. 2d 11. The Griffith Company had a contract to install 
a pipeline at Hill Field. The airforce hard surfaced part 
of Hill Field in such manner as to cause the rainfall to wash 
out this pipeline. Suit was brought under the Tort Claims 
Act, and the plaintiff's president testified that his company 
would have made a profit of a stated sum per month during 
the time it had to stand by while the repairs were being 
made. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals brushed aside 
this testimony in these words : 
"* * * What the loss of profits or dam·age 
to plaintiff's business would be, if any, is pure guess-
work on the part of plaintiff's president and far too 
speculative to sustain a judgment for this claim. 
* * *" 
This is not the first case in which a plaintiff has failed 
to prove any damage resulting from the omission of adver-
tising from the yellow pages of a telephone directory. In 
Shealys Incorporated v. Southern Bell Telephone, etc., Com-
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pany, 126 F. Sup. 382, the plaintiffwasadistributorofMack 
trucks, and had for years advertised its name, number and 
other information in the yellow pages of the Telephone 
Company's directory. The advertisement was omitted from 
the 1951 directory. The plaintif~ for the purpose of prov-
ing loss of profits classified its business into local and 
transient business. It proved that its so-called transient 
business fell off after the omission of the advertisement 
from the classified part of the directory . The court said 
that this testimony was wholly insufficient to prove any 
damage attributable to the omission of plaintiff's adver-
tisement, although it fully recognized that loss of profits 
is a proper element of damage provided it is established that 
the profits would reasonably have been realized except for 
the defendant's conduct. We quote from the decision: 
"The injury suffered, if any, by the plaintiff 
was the loss of such profits as would have resulted 
from the publishing of the advertisement. Whether 
the plaintiff's gross profits would have increased 
if the advertisement had been published is a matter 
of mere speculation and conjecture. Since the plain-
tiff has failed to introduce any evidence even tend-
ing to show that its gross sales would have been 
increased had the advertisement been published, the 
mere fact that the gross profits for a preceding per-
iod were in excess of the gross profits for the period 
during which the advertisement was omitted from 
the directory is insufficient to show that the decrease 
in gross profits was the proximate result of the de-
fendant's failure to publish the advertisement. Their 
causal relation to the breach is purely speculative." 
In the Shealys case the court relied upon the case of 
Schwanke v. Wisconsin Telephone Company, 199 Wis. 552, 
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227 N. W. 30, which was another case involving an error 
in a telephone directory. Plaintiff operated a jewelry store. 
His name and number were listed correctly in one section 
of the defendant's telephone directory, and incorrectly in 
.another. He sought to recover loss of profits, and the jury 
.awarded him $600.00. He claimed that the error in the 
directory caused a loss of business, and testified that there 
was a falling off of gross receipts during the period the 
error in the directory existed, as compared to the amount of 
business done before such error occurred. The Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin vacated the judgment, stating in the 
course of the opinion : 
"* * * This evidence goes no further than 
to indicate that there was a falling off of sales in 
December and January, during which time he· had 
unsatisfactory telephone service. But it is incum-
bent upon the plaintiff to establish that the falling 
off in sales was attributable to the unsatisfactory 
telephone service. 
* * * * * 
"* * * The record is barren of any evidence 
to indicate the loss of a single sale by reason of the 
error in the telephone book. The evidence furnishes 
no justification for a conclusion that plaintiff's sales 
were diminished by reason of such error. The 
amount awarded for this item of damages cannot 
stand." 
Appellant is aware of the impotency of his evidence 
relating to damages. He argues that the degree of proof 
required in this case is less than is required in an a utomo-
bile damage case. No authority for such a position is cited, 
and we submit that none can be found. 
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Appellant also relies upon the authorities· which hold 
that when the fact of damage is clearly established the jury 
should be allowed some discretion under proper instruc-
tions to determine the amount of such damage. The diffi-
culty in applying this principle to the case at bar arises 
out of the complete absence of any evidence tending to prove 
the fact of damage. As has already been shown, the plain-
tiff suffered no loss or injury whatsoever, much less a loss 
or injury attributable to the failure of the defendant to 
advertise his name and number in the yellow pages. 
Burtensha~v v. Bountiful Irrigation Company, 90 Utah 196, 
61 P. 2d 312, sets forth the rule thus: 
"* * * We recognize the fact that damages 
are not always susceptible to exact and accurate 
proof and that a great deal of latitude must be 
taken by the jury in fixing the amount of damages 
in such cases. The applicable rule is stated in 17 
C. J. 756, as follows: 'The rule against the recovery 
of uncertain damages generally has been directed 
against uncertainty as to cause rather than uncer-
tainty as to measure or extent. In other words, the 
rule against uncertain or contingent damages ap-
plies only to such damages as are not the certain 
results of the breach, and not to such as are the cer-
tain results but uncertain in amount. In many cases, 
although substantial damages are established, their 
amount is, in so far as susceptible of pecuniary ad-
measurement, either entirely uncertain or extremely 
difficult of ascertainment; in such cases plaintiff 
is not denied all right of recovery, and the amount 
is fixed by the jury in the exercise of a sound dis-
cretion under proper instructions from the court.' " 
Appellant concludes his argument with the plea that 
since it is impossible to prove any actual damage in a case 
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of this character, a substantial judgment ought to be ren-
dered as a sort of a punishment for "discriminating" against 
the plaintiff by omitting his advertisement from the yellow 
pages. A sufficient answer to this is that the omission was 
entirely inadvertent (Tr. 38, 39). 
Plaintiff's difficulty is not one of proof, but of fact. 
He has sustained no injury and has suffered no harm. The 
assumed breach of contract by the defendant was purely 
technical and no damage was caused by it. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ASSESSING NOM-
INAL DAMAGES IN THE SUM OF SEVENTY 
FIVE DOLLARS. 
The defendant is the only party aggrieved by the judg-
ment appealed from. Its cross-appeal presents the question 
whether damages in the amount of $75.00 can be regarded 
as nominal damages only. 
There can be no doubt but that the trial court intended 
to render a judgment for nominal damages only. The form 
of judgment signed by him expressly states that the award 
is "for nominal damages only assessed in the sum of $75.00" 
(R. 43). 
Nominal damages have been defined as dan1ages in 
name only allowed simply in recognition of a technical in-
jury or right. Thompson v. Anderson, 107 Utah 331, 153 
P. 2d 665, Bigler v. Fryer, 82 Utah 380, 25 P. 2d 598. 
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If the damages awarded exceed a trifling or inconse-
quential sum, they cease to be nominal damages and must 
be supported by proof. (See cases cited above.) It may be 
that $75.00 is a trifling or inconsequential sum in the esti-
mation of the trial court, but it is not so regarded by the 
authorities. See ChowchiUa National Bank v. Nilmeier, 83 
Cal. App .... , 256 Pac. 298, Price v. McComish, 22 Cal. 
App. 2d 92, 70 P. 2d 998. 
In conclusion we respectfully submit that the trial 
court properly vacated the verdict of the jury for the reason 
that the evidence is entirely insufficient to support it. We 
concede that there was no error in awarding plaintiff a 
judgment for nominal damages. We contend that $75.00 is 
not a nominal sum and that this item should be stricken 
from the judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Grant H. Bagley, for 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
Attorneys for Defer~r 
dant and Resp-ondent. 
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